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The Kentucky No Action Statute: Down
for the Count?
INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky no action statute limits the time for bringing
actions involving improvements to real property I Since its enact-
ment over two decades ago, the statute has functioned as a source
of confusion and uncertainty for potential litigants. Kentucky's
statute (the "Act"), like scores of similar statutes enacted across
the nation, was promoted by lobbyists for the design and construc-
tion industries2 as a means of limiting formerly untethered litigation
aimed at those industries. These enactments extinguish causes of
action against architects and builders after a stipulated number of
years following substantial completion of a project. 3
KENTucKY REVIsED STATUTES § 413.135 actions for damages ansing out of injury.
(1) No action to recover damages, whether based upon contract or sounding
in tort, resulting from or arsing out of any deficiency in the construction
components, design, planning, supervision, inspection or construction of any
improvement to real property, or for any injury to property, either real or
personal, arising out of such deficiency, shall be brought against any person
after the expiration of seven (7) years following the substantial completion of
such improvement.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, in the case
of such an injury to property or the person or wrongful death resulting from
such injury which injury occurred dunng the seventh year following substantial
completion of such improvement, an action to recover damages for such injury
or wrongful death may only be brought within one (1) year from the date
upon which such injury occurred (irrespective of the date of death), but in no
event may such an action be brought more than eight years after the substantial
completion of construction of such improvement.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as extending the period prescribed
by statute for the bringing of any action for damages.
(4) As used in this section, the term "person" shall mean an individual,
corporation, partnership, business trust, unincorporated association or joint
stock company; the term "substantial completion" shall be construed to mean
the date upon which the owner of the structure, project or facility first entered
upon the occupancy or commenced the use thereof.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Baldwin Supp. 1989) [hereinafter KRS].
2 See generally Comment, Recent Statutory Developments Concerning the Limitations
of Actions Against Architects, Engineers and Builders, 60 KY. L.J. 462, 464-66 (1971-72).
,Id.
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The popular name of these enactments, "no action statutes,"
was derived from the intended effect of the legislation.4 The design
and construction industries advocated this legislation because con-
struction defects in buildings, and injuries resulting therefrom, may
occur decades after the work is completed. 5 The unique quality of
no action statutes becomes apparent when contrasted with tradi-
tional statutes of limitation. Traditional statutes of limitation run
from the date of the plaintiff's injury, at which time the action
"accrues. "6 No action statutes, however, may extinguish an action
before an injury occurs (accrual). Under these statutes, the time
limit for bringing an action runs from the date when construction
is substantially complete, regardless of when an actual injury oc-
curs.
7
The confusion regarding no action legislation stems from the
history of these statutes. Among thirty-seven states that have en-
acted some form of this statute, thirty-three have faced constitu-
tional challenges with mixed results.8 At least six states have
4 See generally Annotation, 93 ALR3d 1242, 1245-49 (1979).
1 Id. See also Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-
Blueprints for No-Action, 18 CArH. U.L. REv 361 (1969).
6 See Comment, supra note 5.
7Id.
8 The following cases upheld the constitutionality of the statute: Carter v. Harten-
stein, 455 S.W.2d 918 (Ark. 1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Regents of the
Umversity of California v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 112 (Cal.
App. 1976); Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982); Zapata v. Burns,
542 A.2d 700 (Conn. 1988); Cheswold Vol. Fire Co. v. Lambertson Constr. Co., 489 A.2d
413 (Del. 1984); Britt v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 637 F Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 1986);
American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West & Conyers, Architects and Eng'rs, 491 So.2d 573 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Mullis v. Southern Co. Services, 296 So. 2d 579 (Ga. 1982); Twin
Falls Climc & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 644 P.2d 341 (Idaho 1982); People Ex. Rel.
Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. 1986); Beecher v.
White, 447 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. App. 1983); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. #2, 366 So.
2d 1381 (La. 1978); Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178 (Md. 1985);
Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1982); O'Bnen v. Hazelet & Erdal, 299 N.W.2d
336 (Mich. 1980); Calder v. City of Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982); Anderson v.
Fred Wagner & Roy Anderson, Jr., Inc., 402 So.2d 320 (Miss. 1981); Reeves v. Ille Electric
Co., 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976); Williams v. Kingery Constr. Co., 404 N.W.2d 32 (Neb.
1986); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662 (N.J. 1972); Howell v. Burk,
568 P.2d 214 (N.M. App. 1977); Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 302 S.E.2d 868 (N.C.
1983); Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733 (N.D. 1988); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, Dykes, Goodenberger, Bower & Clancy, 740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir.
1984); Joseph v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 (Ore. 1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978); Walsh v. Gowing, 494 A.2d 543 (R.I. 1985); Harmon v.
Angus R. Jessup Associates, Inc., 619 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1981); Suburban Homes v.
Austin-Northwest Dev. Co., 734 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); Good v. Christensen,
527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974);
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amended their statutes in response to constitutional challenges. 9 In
Kentucky alone, the Act failed twice to pass constitutional muster
and was amended once as a consequence of judicial action.10 De-
spite this scrutiny, Kentucky's statute remains constitutionally un-
sound. As recently as February of 1989, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals noted that the constitutionality of the no action statute in
its current, amended form is "dubious."'"
This Comment examines the brief, but active history of Ken-
tucky's statute of repose and its current status in light of the 1986
amendment and the Court of Appeals' comments in Radcliff Homes,
Inc. v Jackson. 2 This Comment also addresses the similar con-
fusion in other states and focuses on possible alternatives and
guidelines for future amendments.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF No ACTION STATUTES: LIABILITY OF
ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS
Liability for defective design or construction of buildings can
be traced from ancient Babylon through English common law to
early American jurisprudence.' 3 However, the doctrine of privity
Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating & Plumbing Co., 503 P.2d 108
(Wash. 1972).
The following cases held the no action statute unconstitutional: Jackson v. Mannes-
mann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1983); Turner Constr. Co., Inc. v. Scales, 752
P.2d 467 (Ark. 1988); Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Haw. 1982);
Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Ill.
1967); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yeager, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. All Electnc, Inc., 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983); Henderson Clay
Products, Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Assocs., 451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982); Broome v. Truluck,
241 S.W.2d 739 (S.C. 1978); Daugaard v. Baltic Co-Op. Bldg. Supply Ass'n, 349 N.W.2d
419 (S.D. 1984); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D. Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 (Wis. 1975);
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980).
9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95-11(3)(c) (Supp. 1980) replaces a 1975 statute held unconsti-
tutional in Overland Construction Co. v. Simmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); HA. REV
STAT. § 657-8 (1985) replaces earlier statutes twice held unconstitutional; ILL. ANN. STAT.
Ch. 110, para. 13-214 (Smith-Hurd 1989) replaces a statute held unconstitutional in Skinner
v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassalbaum, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 34 (Il1. 1986); Ky. REV STAT. ANN.
§ 413.135 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.051 (West 1990) supersedes a
1965 statute; NEv. REV STAT. Chapter 11 (Michie 1989) replaces a 1965 statute held
unconstitutional.
,0 See Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) and Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d
179 (Ky. 1986); KRS § 413.135(1) (Michie Supp. 1988).
" See Radcliff Homes v. Jackson, 766 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. App. 1989).
,2 Id. at 63.
," See generally Comment, Design for Challenge: The Kentucky Statute of Repose for
Improvements to Real Property, 73 KY. L.J. 1143 (1984-85). That Comment fully describes
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of contract, 14 established in 1842, kept the frequency of early
litigation against the construction industry at a mimmum.'5 Nearly
a century passed before this barrier to liability tumbled, leaving
the design and construction industries vulnerable to lawsuits from
an expanded group of potential claimants. Further, this vulnera-
bility would continue for the entire life of the structure or improve-
ment.' 6 In the absence of the privity barrier, any intended
beneficiaries of a contract with a builder or designer might re-
cover. 7 With increasing litigation on the horizon, the construction
industry mobilized to develop limits on liability resulting from
construction projects.1 8 The American Institute of Architects, the
National Society of Professional Engineers and the Associated
General Contractors of America collectively developed model no
action statutes.19 The groups lobbied for enactment of these statutes
across the nation, with notable success. 20 Kentucky followed suit
and enacted a no action statute similar to the model in 1966.21
the historical background of the statute in Kentucky and across the nation. This Comment
focuses largely on developments since Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1986), an
opimon not final at press time in the earlier Comment.
" "Pnvity of contract" is defined as a "relationship which exists between two or
more contracting parties. It was traditionally essential to the maintenance of an action on
any contract that there should subsist such privity between the plaintiff and defendant in
respect of the matter sued on." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1049 (5th ed. 1979).
11 The doctrine of privity of contract was established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10
M&W 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402 (1842). A third party sought a judgment against a "design
professional" for injuries resulting from unsafe conditions in a structure. Recovery was
demed because the third party lacked privity with the "design professional."
16 Judge Cardozo dealt a blow to the privity restriction in a notorious products liability
case. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). However, the
"knock-out punch" was delivered in Inman v. Binghampton Housing Auth., 143 N.E.2d
895 (N.Y. 1957), when the privity barriers were broken in the arena of architects' and
contractors' liability. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 361.
17 See A. CORBN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 776-777 (1951).
" See Comment, supra note 5, at 365.
19 The model statutes expressly barred actions to recover damages "for any deficiency
in the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of
improvement to real property," as well as for injuries to property or person. See Comment,
supra note 5, at 365 n.31.
10 See OFcE FOR PROFEssIONAL LIABrITY REsEARCH, VICTOR 0. SCHINNERER & Co.,
A/E LEGAL NEWSLETr R, Special Supplement No. 1, Revision No. 7 (1988). The statutory
limitations vary, ranging from two to fifteen years. Id.
2 Kentucky's legislature initially enacted a law aimed at limiting liability of those
connected with the construction industry, whereby causes of action "for personal injuries
suffered by any person against the builder of a home or other improvements" were required
to be brought within 5 years of the original occupancy of the improvement. KRS §
413.120(14) (1964). In 1966, a "no-action" statute, patterned after the model statute
promoted by the construction industry, was enacted. KRS § 413.125 (1966). This statute
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Inherent problems soon emerged as, one by one, the statutes met
constitutional challenges. 22
The statutes found unconstitutional generally were invalidated
on one of three grounds: (1) the statutes violated due process
guarantees because their ambiguous titles inadequately apprised the
public of the statutes' effects;23 (2) the statutes ignored equal pro-
tection guarantees since the persons involved in the design and
construction industries did not compose a class warranting special
treatment and immunmty from smt;24 or (3) the statutes violated
state constitutional prohibitions of legislation that destroys existing
legal remedies. 25 Kentucky's statute has not been immune to these
attacks. To the contrary, KRS section 413.135 withstood several
constitutional attacks and has, undergone several changes over the
past twenty years. 26
II. RouND I. T H CONSTTUToNAL RIGHT TO A REMEDY FOR
PERSONAL INJURIES
The first serious constitutional challenge to Kentucky's no ac-
tion statute occurred in 1973,27 just seven years after its enactment.
The Act had been tested previously in the Sixth Circuit,28 where
attempted to extinguish all actions to recover damages for injury to property or person
against those involved in the "design, planning, supervision, inspection or construction of
any improvement after five years." KRS § 413.125 (1966). The act specifically excluded
from its coverage owners, tenants, and those in control of the improvement. See generally
Stipanowich, Kentucky's "No Action" Statute: Recalled to Life?, 51 Ky. BENCH & BAR
No. 3, p. 112 (1987).
2 See supra notes 8 and 9.
11 See, e.g., Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 313 So.2d 518 (Ala. 1975).
2 See Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973). The court held that the statute
designated an unsupportable classification that failed to meet the equal protection guaranty.
Hawaii's Supreme Court concluded that the statute called for arbitrary and capricious
discrimination.
See Skaner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (Il. 1967). The court determined that
the Illinois statute violated the state constitutional provision prohibiting the General Assem-
bly from passing local or special laws providing for any corporation, association, or
individual any special or exclusive pnvilege, nin or franchise. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
110, para. 13-214 has since been amended to e ._.-ar l'discovery rule" limitation, whereby
an action must be brought within four years of the time of discovery of the act or omission
of the person engaged in design or construction. See OFFIcE FoR PRoFEssIoNAL LIABILITY
REsEARCH, supra note 20, at 4-5.
2 See generally Lee v. Fister, 413 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1969); Tabler, 704 S.W.2d 179;
In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 672 S.W.2d 922, 583 F Supp. 1163 (E.D. Ky. 1984);
Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1982); Ball Homes, Inc. v. Volpert, 633 S.W.2d 63
(Ky. 1982); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
Lee v. Fister, 413 F.2d 1286 (6th Cir. 1969).
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the statute's validity was upheld. 29 However, Kentucky's highest
court attracted the attention of the construction industry when it-
decided to review Saylor v Hall on constitutional grounds.30 Anuci
curiae briefs were submitted by the American Institute of Archi-
tects, the National Society of Architects, Kentucky Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers, Consulting Engineers Council of Kentucky,
Kentucky Highway Division, Homebuilders Association of Ken-
tucky and three regional Associated General Contractors groups.
3
'
Despite this onslaught of support- the unfairness of the Act was
made apparent by the facts of the case. The suit was brought a
year after the death and injury of two children caused by the
collapse of a fourteen year old stone fireplace in the plaintiff's
home.32 The trial court dismissed the case against the builder be-
cause the Kentucky no action statute extinguished the plaintiff's
cause of action five years after completion of ins home.33 The
Court of Appeals reversed and found that a statute that destroys
a common law right of action for negligence before it accrues
violates Kentucky's constitutional guarantee of a judicial remedy
for personal injury or wrongful death. 34 The Court admonished
the legislature that such statutes "perform an abortion of the right
of action, not in the first trimester, but before conception.1 35 Thus,
Kentucky's highest court adnnistered the first blow to the consti-
tutional vitality of the no action statute.
Following Saylor, the Act was unenforced for nearly a decade.
However, in 1982, without overruling Saylor, Kentucky's Supreme
Court twice reexamined the "Saylor test"3 6 and adopted a less
"' The Sixth Circuit construed the limitation "as an added protection to builders, who
might otherwise be liable for accidents resulting from dilapidated conditions in detenorating
structures. " See id. at 1289.
10 497 S.W.2d at 218 (Ky. 1973).
1, Id. The court commended the "excellent and exhaustive bnefs filed by various
interested groups that have appeared by our permission as amici curiae m this appeal. "
2 Id. at 220.
3 Id.
3 Id. at 224.
3S Id.
36 The test applied in Saylor determined whether a constitutionally-protected cause of
action existed at the time the statute was enacted. See Saylor, 497 S.W.2d at 224. It was
unsuccessfully argued m Saylor that KRS § 413.135 did not extinguish a constitutionally-
protected cause of action for negligence where the plaintiff was a third party, possessing
no privity of contract with appellee and the defendant was a contractor whose work had
been completed and accepted by the owner, with whom appellee shared privity. Id. at 223.
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stringent guide for application of the no action statute.37 In ad-
dressing Carney v. Moody,3 the Court distinguished Saylor by
noting that the common law, as it prevailed in 1891, 39 would not
have afforded a remedy against the builder for personal injuries in
the absence of privity 4 Thus, although the Saylor 'test was left
intact, the focus of the test was modified to turn on whether such
a cause of action existed in 1891, the time the Kentucky Consti-
tution was enacted.41 The Court concluded that because the privity
doctrine had prevented third party causes of action against builders
and architects in 1891, the Kentucky Constitution would not now
.guarantee such causes of action.42 The Carney decision thereby
gave the legislature the prerogative to limit causes of action not
constitutionally protected in 1891 .43
III. RouND II: TME CONSTITUTIONAL GuARANTEEs oF EQUAL
PROTECTION
Although the Act survived its first constitutional confrontation,
it enjoyed only short-lived favor. The Beverly Hills Fire Litigation
in 1984 marked the beginning of the Act's second series of consti-
tutional challenges. 44 Tus suit arose from a tragic' fire at the
Beverly Hills Supper Club in Northern Kentucky, which killed 265
people and injured hundreds more. 45 Aluminum wiring manufac-
turers and suppliers attempted to employ the no action statute as
" The court held m Carney v. Moody that the constitutional protections that were
the focus of Saylor v. Hall were not violated by application of the no action statute to
causes of action not recognized in 1891, the time of passage of Kentucky's constitution.
See Carney v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. 1982).
In 1982 the Kentucky Supreme Court first examined KRS § 413.135 m Ball Homes,
Inc. v. Volpert, 633 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1982). In Ball Homes, the court used the Saylor test
and held that the plaintiff's claim was not one that existed when the no action statute was
enacted. The court held that there was, therefore, no constitutional impediment to barring
the action and dismissed the case. See Ball Homes, 633 S.W.2d at 63. The Ball Homes
decision did not have the impact of Carney. In Carney, the court held that the constitutional
protections that were the focus of Saylor were not violated by application of the no action
statute to causes of action not recognized in 1891, the time of passage of the state
constitution. SeeCarney, 646 S.W.2d at 41.
3S646 S.W.2d at 40.
31 The Kentucky Constitution was enacted m 1891.
10 See Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 41.
41 Id.
4 Id.
43 Id.
"See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 583 F Supp. 1163 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
4 Id. at 1165-66.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
a shield against potential liability for the tragedy 4 Upon certifi-
cation of the question by a federal court,47 Kentucky's Supreme
Court held the statute of repose was inapplicable to manufacturers
of construction components such as aluminum wirlng. 4" While ex-
pressly reserving determination of the Act's constitutionality, the
Court noted that Kentucky's Constitution forbids any "special act"
that "arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification discriminate[s]
against some persons or objects and favor[s] others." 49
The Supreme Court explained that suppliers of materials for
construction projects should not be favored in law over suppliers
of materials for other products and industries. 0 This group's ex-
eusiQn from the shield left the Kentucky no action statute an
obtrusive target for the equal protection attack that had precipi-
tated the demise of similar statutes of other states.51
The holdings in the Beverly Hills Fire Litigation12 set the stage
for the second blow to the no action statute, which was delivered
in Tabler v Wallace and General Electric v Nucor 53 Both cases
involved appeals from summary judgments in the circuit court
barring claims against the architects, contractors and suppliers.5 4
The circuit court judges determined that the claims were not filed
" Id. at 1166.
41 Pursuant to KY. R. Clv PROC. 76.37(1), Judge Wilhoit certified to the Kentucky
Supreme Court the question of whether the no action statute was constitutional as applied
to the facts of the Beverly Hills Fire case. Id. at 1165.
43 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation,* 672 S.W.2d at 925.
4 Id. at 926. Kentucky's Constitution provides as follows:
Local and Special Legislation. The General Assembly shall not pass local or
special acts concermng any of the following subjects, namely:
Fifth: To regulate the limitation of civil or criminal causes.
Ky. CONST. § 59.
In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 672 S.W.2d at 926.
s1 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
32 See supra notes 44, 47, 48 and accompanying text.
11 See Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1986). Tabler v. Wallace and General
Electric v. Nucor were consolidated for review by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Tabler v.
Wallace was granted discretionary review while General Electric v. Nucor was pending
before the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court accepted transfer. The cases involved
identical issues. See Stipanowich, supra note 21, at 12.
The wife of an elevator maintenance man who was fatally injured while working on a
hotel elevator in Lexington, Kentucky brought Tabler v. Wallace. She sued the elevator
company, the installer of the elevator, and the architect who approved the design. See
Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 180.
General Electric v. Nucor was initiated by the owner of a warehouse whose roof
collapsed due to the failure of the support trusses. The owner sought damages from the
architect, the contractor and the supplier of the trusses. See Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 180-81.
Id. at 181.
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within five years from the date of substantial completion of the
structures, and were thus barred by the statute. 55
Kentucky's Supreme Court granted Tabler discretionary review
and accepted transfer of General Electric v Nucor 6 to address the
constitutionality of issues yet unanswered.5 7 Justice Leibson, writ-
ing the opimon for a divided court 58 found that the legislature
failed to provide adequate justification for creating a special class
of builders, architects and engineers and for " conferring spe-
cial privileges and unimunities on that class. "59 The only ap-
parent justification for the legislation was a persuasive lobbying
effort by those faced with increasing exposure to litigation 0 Justice
Leibson noted the express purpose of Section 59(5)61 of the consti-
tution is to prevent those who gain sufficient political power or
who can afford an influential lobbyist from achieving immunity
from laws that govern others. 62 Other groups, such as the manu-
facturers and suppliers, possessed insufficient political pull to gain
the benefits of this "legislative windfall." 63 Justice Leibson con-
cluded that this statute could not withstand public policy analysis,6
and that it offended the intent and purpose of Section 59 of the
Kentucky Constitution. 65
IV RoUND III. THE UNFouGHT BATTLE-VAGUENESS OF TITLE
In Tabler, Justice Leibson indicated that the Act may be de-
fective in yet another respect. 6 Reference to KRS section 413.135
55 Id.
16 See supra note 53.
-' Kentucky courts had not considered whether the no action statute violated equal
protection guarantees or constituted "special legislation." Other states had confronted these
issues. See supra notes 24 and 25.
5g See Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 179. Justice Vance concurred in part and dissented in
part. Justice Stephenson dissented by separate opinion and Justice Wintersheimer dissented.
11 Id. at 187.
6 Id.
"1 Id. Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits'Iocal and special legislation.
Accord Phillips v. ABC Builders, 611 P.2d 821 (Vyo. 1989) (invalidating a no action statute
under a provision substantially identical to Kentucky's Section 59(5)).
62 See Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 187.
63 Id.
6, Id. The Tabler court engaged in public policy analysis when it considered the recent
catastrophe involving the collapse of an overhead walkway in Kansas City's Hyatt Regency
Hotel. This collapse injured hundreds of people and was caused by faulty design and
construction. The court found it repugnant to its sense of decency that the interests of a
special group should take priority over the protection of the general public.
Id. at 186.
6 Id. at 184-85. Justice Leibson noted Alabama's struggle with similar issues. See id.
at 185.
1990-91]
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as a statute of limitations67 is misleading. 68 The statute does not
function as a limitation on the time within which one may bring
an action after it accrues. Instead, this legislation extinguishes a
cause of action prior to accrual. 69
Alabama's no action statute fell victim to a constitutional
challenge on grounds alluded to by Justice Liebson in Tabler In
Bagby Elevator and Electric Company, Inc. v. McBride,70 Alaba-
ma's Supreme Court held Alabama's no action statute unconsti-
tutional under Alabama's counterpart to Section 5171 of the
Kentucky Constitution. It found Alabama's statute offensive in
two ways: (1) the title failed to clearly express the subject of the
statute, and (2) the content of the act embraced two subjects, a
statute of limitations and a provision abolishing certain rights of
action against architects and builders. 72 Alabama's Supreme Court
determined that a title indicating a statute of limitations m the
traditional sense73 concealed the true nature of the act, which
creates absolute immunity against certain suits. Kentucky's Su-
preme Court lamented similar problems with KRS Section 413.135;
however, the court stopped short of any decision regarding the
constitutional validity of the statute's title.74
V THE AMENDED STATUTE AND RADCLIFF HomEs v JACKSON
In 1986, the legislature followed up on the Supreme Court's
admomshments in Tabler and amended the no action statute.75 The
Kentucky General Assembly repaired the statute in three important
respects. First, the statute's scope was broadened to encompass
manufacturers and suppliers of construction components. 76 This
change apparently was in response to the equal protection criticisms
67 See infra note 84. The statute is also placed in Chapter 413, entitled "Limitations
of Actions." See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 185.
69 Id. at 185.
70 291 So.2d 306 (Ala. 1974).
,' Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 184-85. Section 51 of Kentucky's Constitution prohibits laws
relating to more than one subject, unless clearly expressed m the title. Section 45 of the
Alabama Constitution provides virtually the same protections. See Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at
184-85.
- Bagby Elevator and Electric Company, Inc. v. McBride, 291 So.2d 306, 312 (Ala.
1974).
,' Id. at 312.
-, Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 185.
71 See infra note 92 for the text of the 1986 version of KRS § 413.135.
76 See id.
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voiced by the court in the Beverly Hills Fire Litigation and later
in Tabler. This alteration afforded all members of the construction
industry "no action" protection.77
Secondly, the amendment added a brief preamble of purpose
in an attempt to establish legislative istory and thwart future
equal protection attacks. 7 In Tabler, Justice Leibson hinted that
the absence of legislative history of KRS Section 413.135 contrib-
uted to its dermse. 79 In response the legislature provided justifica-
tion,80 albeit scant, for affording special statutory protection to the
construction industry.
The third change is somewhat more perplexing. The legislature
extended the time within winch a plaintiff must sue from five to
seven years after substantial completion. 81 Tins can be explained
only as a fairness modification, mitigating the sometimes harsh
effects82 of the statute.
Apparently, the legislature acted with too much haste, as the
amended statute remains riddled with flaws. The problems regard-
ing vagueness, to which Justice Leibson alluded in Tabler,13 remain
unaddressed. The 1986 statute is described as "An Act relating to
limitations of actions." 4 This title fails to reveal the true nature
of the act, which is, effectively, an absolute bar to actions arising
from improvements to real property more than seven years after
substantial completion.8 5 The title does not give adequate notice to
the public of the effect and potential consequences of the statute.8 6
Additionally, in Radcliff Homes, Inc. v. Jackson, 7 the Court
of Appeals recently expressed doubts about the constitutionality of
See id.
7 H.B. 543, 1986 Reg. Sess., 1986 Acts Issue 1345. The preamble states, "WHEREAS
without protection by a statute of limitations there will be a chilling effect on the contri-
butions of builders, architects, engineers, suppliers, manufacturers and materialmen to the
state's economy."
Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 184-87 (Ky. 1986).
$0 See supra note 78.
1' See supra note I for the text of KRS § 413.135.
2 The foreclosure of claims arising from such tragic events as the Beverly Hills Super
Club fire, the Hyatt Regency walkway collapse and Saylor v. Hall illustrates the sometimes
harsh effect of the statute.
- Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 184-85.
u H.B. 543, Ky. Acts chapter 479, Reg. Sess. (Baldwin 1986). The prior version of
the statute was entitled, "An Act relating to the Statute of Limitations. "Ky. Acts, ch.
246 (Baldwin 1966).
Tabler, 704 S.W.2d at 184.
I d.
See Radcliff Homes, Inc. v. Jackson, 766 S.W.2d 63, 68 (Ky. App. 1989).
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the amended statute. An agitated property owner sued his neigh-
bors, the owners of an odoriferous septic tank.88 The owners of
the malfunctiomng tank then sued the builder of their home, six
years and three months after substantial completion.8 9 The builder
based his defense upon an anomaly90 then found in the amended
version of the no action statute.9' KRS section 413.135(2) was the
unaltered remnant of the 1966 statute.92 It provided that in the
case of injury to property or person during the fifth year following
substantial completion, an action could have been brought within
one year after the date of injury, "but in no event may such an
action be brought more than six years after the substantial com-
pletion of construction of such improvement." 93 This error caused
amended section one of the statute to bar actions seven years after
substantial completion, while section two barred actions six years
after substantial completion.9 4 Kentucky's Legislative Research
Commission subsequently corrected this anomaly 9-
The Court of Appeals disregarded the builder's defense and
held that KRS section 413.135 did not bar the plaintiff's claim. 96
Although the court did not specifically address the statutory anom-
aly, it opined that the constitutionality of the amended act is
See zd. at 64-65.
19 Id. at 68.
90 See Stipanowich, supra note 21, at 58.
11 Radcliff Homes, 766 S.W.2d at 67-68.
9 The 1986 version of sections one and two of KRS § 413.135 reads as follows:
Actions for damages arising out of injury.
(1) No action to recover damages, whether based upon contract or sounding
in tort, resulting from or arising out of any deficiency in the construction
components, design, planmng, supervision, inspection or construction of any
improvement to real property, or for any injury to property, either real or
personal, arising out of such deficiency, shall be brought against any person
after the expiration of seven (7) years following the substantial completion of
such improvement.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, in the case
of such an injury to pioperty or the person or wrongful death resulting from
such injury which injury occurred during the fifth year following substantial
completion of such improvement, an action to recover damages for such injury
or wrongful death may only be brought within one (1) year from the date
upon which such injury occurred (irrespective of the date of death), but in no
event may such an action be brought more than six (6) years after the
substantial completion of construction of such improvement.
Ky. RE STAT. ANN. § 413.185 (Micie Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988).
93 Id. (emphasis added).
9 Id.
95 Ky. REV STAT. ANN. § 7.136 (Michie Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1990).
9Radcliff Homes, 766 S.W.2d at 68.
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"dubious." 97 Apparently, the court determined that the faulty sav-
ings clause98 was ineffective, as reflected in the court's remark that,
"[w]e need not delve into that bucket of worms as the statute in
question only cuts off actions filed more than seven years after
completion of the improvement. "99 The Court of Appeals did
not expand on the reasons for its doubts, but the commentary
found in Radcliff Homes indicates the Court's dissatisfaction with
the statute in its present form. 100
VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR AMENDMENT
To address the flaws of the Act, the Kentucky General Assem-
bly need not wait until the state Supreme Court sounds the death
knell of the no action statute. Before proceeding, ample consider-
ation should be given to similar legislative stumbles experienced by
other states.10' After a flurry of constitutional challenges, other
jurisdictions have been innovative in their approaches to no action
statute reform. 1' These options deserve careful examination before
redraft is attempted.
Many no action, statutes enjoying constitutional validity are
structured similarly to Kentucky's version. Colorado's no action
statute combines a short discovery rule limitation with an extended
outer limit to actions.o A potential plaintiff is given a brief grace
period after discovery to file an action, and the building industry
9 Id.
" Subsection two of KRS § 413.135 is referred to as a "savings clause" because it
extends the limitation period by a year for parties injured near the expiration of subsection
one's limitation penod. See Stipanowich, supra note 21, at 58.
Radcliff Homes, 766 S.W.2d at 68.
10D Id.
"Io See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also OFFICE FOR PROFESSIONA LLBurr
RESEARCH, VICTOR O. SCmiNNmRER & Co., A/E Legal Newsletter, Revision No. 7 (Spec.
Supp. No. 1 1988).
"0 See COL. REV. STAT. § 13-80-104 (1989). (Action must be brought within two years
after a claim for relief arises, but in no event more than six years after the substantial
completion of the improvement to real property.)
See also Knapp & Lee, Application of Special Statutes Concerning Design and Con-
struction, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 368 (1979). The discovery rule has been applied in
products liability, medical malpractice and other malpractice and negligence actions. This
rule tolls the statute until the plaintiff discovers that he has suffered an injury, or by
reasonable diligence should have discovered it. W PROSSER & R. KEETON, PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS § 30, at 166-67 (5th ed. 1984).
1O See COL. REv. STAT. § 13-80-104 (1989). The statute reqmres that an action must
be brought within two years after the claim for relief arises, but in no event more than six
years after the substantial completion of the improvement to real property.
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enjoys the protection it desires from limitless liability 04 This com-
bination mitigates the harshness of no action legislation while
retaimng its purpose.
Several states vary the limitation period for suits arising from
personal injury and those for suits stemming from injury to prop-
erty 105 These variations apparently were imposed in response to
constitutional challenges regarding preservation of remedies. °6
Utah's no action statute recently met biting vilification from
that state's Supreme Court,1° which found the statute violative of
the Utah open courts provision.108 Accordinig to the court, this
provision of the state constitution may be permissively implicated
only where necessary to promote the public's health, safety, morals
and welfare.1 9 The Utah court determined that the statute failed
to eliminate a social or economic evil, as builders and architects
should not be excused from liability merely because substantial
time has passed between the negligent act and the resultant dam-
age. 10 The court concluded that, even if limiting the construction
industry's liability and insurance premiums were legitimate pur-
poses, the statute was an arbitrary and unreasonable means of
achieving that end."' The court pointed to studies indicating that
only 2.1 percent of all claims made nationwide are initiated more
than seven years after a building's completion.12 Therefore, the
court decided that it was highly unlikely that the statute resulted
in lower insurance rates _'3
Faced with this, litany of constitutional issues, the Kentucky
General Assembly has a tall order to fill. To compose a constitu-
tionally sound statute, the legislature must provide a clear title that
"' See supra note 8; see also Knapp & Lee, supra note 102.
I See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROc. CODE § 337.1 (West Supp. 1977); see also supra notes
20 and 25.
116 See supra notes 20 and 25.
10 See Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes'& Son, Inc., 782 P.2d
188, 191-93 (Utah 1989). The Utah Open Courts provision is found in UTAH CONST., art.
i, § 11.
M" Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 188. The Utah Open Courts provision is found in UTAH
CONST., art. I, § 11, stating: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of
law " Sun Valley, 782 P.2d at 191.
109 Id. at 191-92.
1o Id. at 192.
II Id.
"1 Id. at 193.
113 Id.
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informs the public of the statute's effect and purpose, 1 4 and an
exhaustive legislative history that justifies the Commonwealth's
desire to protect the construction and design industries from lim-
itless liability. 15 The Kentucky legislature also should consider
lengthemng the time bar to mitigate the harshness of the statute.
It may also consider eliminating the no action bar for actions
arising from personal injury. Without these reforms, the current
statute may be false security for those in the construction industry
in Kentucky.
The legislature might consider the following example as a guide-
line for amendment:
AN ACT BARRING ACTIONS CONCERNING IMPROVEMENTS TO REAL
PROPERTY TEN YEARS FoI.OwING SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION
Whereas, without protection limiting the inherently lengthy
duration of liability for those involved in the design, construction
and supply of improvements to real property and the attendant
risks of stale litigation, there will be a chilling effect on the con-
tributions of builders, architects, engineers, suppliers, manufactur-
ers and materialmen to this Commonwealth's economy; and,
Whereas, the construction industry is an essential component
in the continued' growth and development of the Commonwealth;
Now therefore, Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky-
Sections 1 and 2 are amended to read as follows:
413.135 AcTIONS FOR DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF INJURY BARRED
(1) No action to recover damages, whether based upon contract
or sounding in tort, resulting from or arising out of any deficiency
in the construction components, design, planning, supervision,
inspection or construction of any improvement to real property,
or for any injury to property, either real or personal, arising out
of such deficiency, or for injury to the person or for wrongful
death arising out of such deficiency, shall be brought against any
person after the expiration of ten [10] years following the sub-
stantial completion of the improvement.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this sec-
tion, in the caseof such an injury to property or the person or
wrongful death resulting from such injury, which injury occurred
"" See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 49 and 59 and accompanying text.
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during the tenth year following substantial completion of such
improvements, an action to recover damages for such injury or
wrongful death may be brought only within one year from the
date upon which such injury occurred (irrespective of the date of
death), but in no event may an action be brought more than
eleven years after substantial completion.
This model extends the time bar to ten years to fall in line with
those state statutes currently enjoying constitutional validity. 1 6 This
version extinguishes limitless liability from deteriorating structures,
and yet affords a claimant ample time within which to bring an
action. Although only a small number of claims are filed after
seven years,'1 7 the ten year limit gives the industry the security it
seeks and leaves potential plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to
recover for negligence.
This draft, unlike the 1986 amendment, provides consistency
between sections one and two of KRS section 413.135 and accu-
rately provides a safety net in the eleventh year for causes of action
accruing in the tenth year following substantial completion, con-
sistent with the ten year outer limit. The 1986 anomaly was recently
corrected pursuant to KRS section 7.136, the Reviser of Statutes
Act," 8 and the correction is reflected in a 1989 supplement to the
statute." 9 This modification relieves the courts of dealing with
116 See supra notes 8, 20 and 103.
"7 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
Is KRS § 7.136. Alterations in statutes permitted on publication.
(1) The commission, in preparing editions of the statutes or supplements or
pocket parts thereto for publication or distribution, may renumber sections
and parts of sections of the acts of the general assembly, change the wording
of headnotes, divide or rearrange sections and parts of sections, change words
when directed by law, change reference numbers to agree with renumbered
chapters or sections, or to make corrections in reference numbers when sections
referred to are repealed or amended and the correction can be made without
change in the law, and correct manifest clerical or typographical er-
rors.
Ky. REv STAT. ANN. § 7.136 (Baldwin 1989).
"I Ky. RE STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (Baldwin Supp. 1989). This reprint corrects the
anomaly and the Legislative Research Commission notes:
Subsection (1) of this section was amended in 1986 Acts Ch. 479, Section 1,
to extend the period of time in which certain actions may be brought from
five to seven years. Inadvertently, when the period of time was extended by
committee amendment, subsection (2) was not amended to conform. Pursuant
to KRS 7.136, the Reviser of statutes has made a technical correction in order
to make the subsections consistent.
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nonsensical defenses1 20 founded on the prior anomaly in the stat-
ute.1 2
1
The extended preamble of purpose addresses the equal protec-
tion and special legislation concerns raised by the Supreme Court
in Tabler and Beverly Hills Fire.1 2 This prefatory note furnishes
adequate rational basis for distinguishing and immunizing the con-
struction industry from limitless claims. 123
Finally, the title of the draft statute leaves little doubt as to
content of the enactment. Admittedly, the title is cumbersome, but
it affords notice to the public of the effect of the limitation. This
amendment eliminates the vagueness concerns expressed by Justice
Leibson in Table. 1 4 The draft statute accounts for'and corrects
the constitutional deficiencies suggested thus far by Kentucky's
appellate courts and foreseeable problems encountered by other
jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
No action statutes are not inherently evil tools of the construc-
tion industry They are, instead, essential barriers to limitless claims,
without which the construction industry would suffer dire economic
consequences. However, no action statutes, without careful draft-
ing, can be and have been problematic. The judiciary's poignant
admonitions, the draft statute, and the enactments of other juris-
dictions provide ample guidelines for a constitutionally-sound stat-
ute of repose.
Anne Gorham
1 See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
121 See Stipanowich, supra note 21, at 58.
2 See supra notes 44-65 and accompanying text.
M See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
"2A See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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